VeChain (@vechainofficial): VeChain Refutes ByBit’s Allegations, Clarifies Difference Between Freezing and Blocking

VeChain Refutes ByBit’s Allegations, Clarifies Difference Between Freezing and Blocking VeChain does not and has never operated a “hidden” fund freezing feature on its protocol. Allegations in the clickbait study produced by ByBit Lazarus Security Lab are factually incorrect and reputationally damaging - we ask that reports that repeated those claims clarify their articles with our statement and full denial, in the interest of factual accuracy. The reality is quite different from what ByBit’s report is suggesting: VeChain has once, with full community support, created a blocklist to protect the ecosystem in response to a major event that compromised a single VeChain wallet following the theft of a private key. VeChain categorically does not have “freezing capabilities embedded directly in their source code” - we would like to encourage the author of the report to do a deep dive into the technical differences between blocking and freezing, and then consider the implications of getting the two mixed up in a public forum. As a reality check, here is further reading: What actually happened Following a theft in December 2019, the VeChain community approved a one‑time blocklist to protect the ecosystem. Independent validators upgraded node software to reject transactions originating from the thief’s wallets, preventing liquidation of the stolen assets. Funds were not seized or reallocated. This was a targeted, incident‑specific safeguard. (Crypto Economy) Decentralized decision, validator execution The decision to act was put to community governance. Validators executed the outcome by declining to include transactions from the identified addresses. The community effectively approved burning of approximately 727 million VET, resolving the incident transparently on‑chain. (Announcement) How VeChainThor actually works VeChainThor’s software includes consensus‑level checks that allows validators to reject transactions which, once enabled through community governance, rendered the assets immovable. It does not grant any party the unilateral ability to move, seize, or “freeze” funds. Independent audits explicitly describe this behavior and confirm fixes to related edge cases. (Go Packages) On ByBit’s claim Bybit’s positioning conflates a validator‑level inclusion policy with a protocol‑level freeze or seizure function. That conflation is inaccurate and misleading, including where VeChain is grouped among chains with “freezing capabilities embedded directly in their source code.” Votes were executed to protect the ecosystem, with community and validators acted within an open‑source, governance‑driven framework. (T.co) Independent security audits (examples) Our code and upgrades undergo regular third‑party reviews. Recent examples include: NCC Group – VeChainThor Galactica Security Assessment (May 6, 2025): Implementation review of VIP‑242/250/251/252. Two findings, both fixed. Recommends client‑diversity to further strengthen resilience. (NCC Group) Coinspect – VeChainThor Galactica Source Code Audit (May 2025): One medium issue (“blocklisted account could sponsor transactions”) fixed, others low or informational. Confirms the existence of a consensus‑level blocklist check and its scope. Hacken – VeChain Account Abstraction (AAL) and Marketplace‑as‑a‑Service audits (2023–2024): Public reports covering AA contracts and MaaS components. (Hacken) Our next steps We have requested corrections from outlets that repeated the claim and are considering our options regarding Bybit’s communications on this matter. Our door remains open for responsible reporting and direct verification. Where to verify Bybit/Cointelegraph claim that named VeChain. (T.co) Coverage of the one‑time validator blocklist and immobilized funds following the 2019 theft. (Crypto Economy) VeChainThor client and fork configuration references. (Go Packages) Independent audits cited above. Media contact press@vechain.org